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Linking Law and Life: Justice Sotomayor’s 
Judicial Voice 
LAURA KRUGMAN RAY† 
In her five terms on the Supreme Court, Sonia Sotomayor 
has become the most visible and recognizable Justice. Much 
of her public presence is owed to her recent autobiography, 
My Beloved World, which appeared in 2013 and promptly 
rose to the top of the New York Times bestseller list.1 In the 
process, Sotomayor became a public celebrity, speaking 
candidly about her life in media interviews, appearing on 
Sesame Street, throwing out the first baseball at a Yankee 
Stadium game, and ushering in the New Year at Times 
Square.2  
Readers of Justice Sotomayor’s Supreme Court opinions 
might be surprised to find few traces of that exuberant 
personality. Instead, Sotomayor’s voice is generally 
restrained, avoiding the emotional tone that characterizes 
her autobiography. But her judicial voice is scarcely dry and 
academic. It conveys a distinctive judicial persona, that of a 
judge who is often puzzled by the responses of her colleagues 
but not indignant in the manner of Justice Scalia3 or playfully 
  
† Professor of Law, Widener University Delaware Law School; J.D., Yale Law 
School, 1981; Ph.D., Yale University, 1971; A.B., Bryn Mawr College, 1967.  
 1. SONIA SOTOMAYOR, MY BELOVED WORLD (2013); See David Fontana, The 
People’s Justice?, 123 YALE L.J. FORUM 447, 449 (2014).  
 2. For a substantial list of her public appearances, see Fontana, supra note 1, 
at 468-69.  
 3. Laura Krugman Ray, Judicial Personality: Rhetoric and Emotion in 
Supreme Court Opinions, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 193, 226-29 (2002). 
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conversational in the manner of Justice Kagan.4 Sotomayor’s 
judicial persona is generally hard at work trying to 
understand the unfortunate positions taken by her 
colleagues and pointing out to them in an ironic, though 
never harsh, manner their inconsistencies and errors. 
In this spirit, she is likely to react with bewilderment 
rather than anger when she disagrees with the Justices on 
the other side of an issue. Writing in dissent from the 
majority’s view that state law issues heard below are barred 
from habeas review while new claims might be heard, she 
notes that “[t]his suggestion is puzzling.”5 And finding the 
majority’s statement of Fourth Amendment law inaccurate, 
she again observes mildly “[t]hat is puzzling.”6 She has a 
number of synonyms to convey the same response. What the 
other side has offered may be “perplexing,”7 “nothing short of 
baffling,”8 “curious,”9 “paradoxical,”10 something that she 
simply “cannot fathom,”11 or, more broadly, “a mystery the 
majority opinion leaves unsolved.”12 She refrains, however, 
from combative or harshly critical language, and the focus 
remains on the conundrum presented by the other side’s 
outcome.  
In her most extended use of this imagery, Sotomayor in 
dissent compares the process of evaluating the majority’s 
  
 4. Laura Krugman Ray, Doctrinal Conversation: Justice Kagan’s Supreme 
Court Opinions, 89 IND. L.J. SUPP. 1-2 (2013).  
 5. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1418 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). 
 6. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1258 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). 
 7. Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2059 n.4 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). 
 8. Schuette v. Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1664 (2014) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 9. Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1666 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). 
 10. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1120 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting).  
 11. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1673. For another use of the same phrase, see 
Pliva v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2592 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 12. Sossamon, 131 S. Ct. at 1666 n.3. 
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argument in a case awarding custody under the Indian Child 
Welfare Act to the process of solving a mystery.13 Although 
“[a] casual reader of the Court’s opinion could be forgiven for 
thinking this an easy case,”14 the skilled reader knows better. 
Thus, “[t]he reader’s first clue that the majority’s supposedly 
straightforward reasoning is flawed is that not all Members 
who adopt its interpretation believe it is compelled by the 
text of the statute.”15 Next, “[t]he second clue is that the 
majority begins its analysis by plucking out of context a 
single phrase.”16 And “[t]he third clue is that the majority 
openly professes its aversion to Congress’ explicitly stated 
purpose.”17 Like an experienced reader of detective novels, 
the perceptive reader of Court opinions should respond to the 
majority’s baffling result by analysis of the clues provided 
rather than by attack.  
Readers of Sotomayor’s autobiography may be reminded 
of her recollection that, in her early life, the girl detective 
“Nancy Drew had a powerful hold on [her] imagination.”18 
Considering the careers open to her as a diabetic, she ponders 
how she could be a detective without joining the police force, 
an occupation barred by her illness.19 And Nancy Drew, the 
heroine of a series of mystery novels for girls, seemed to 
provide a tempting solution: the eighteen-year-old “sleuth 
tools around in her little blue roadster with the top down,” 
solving mysteries that crop up in her “fairy tale” world of 
summer homes, country clubs, and travel to Paris.20 Nancy is 
“an incurable optimist who cleverly turns obstacles to her 
own advantage.”21 The mystery novels thus offer a tempting, 
though ultimately unreachable, prospect: 
  
 13. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2572 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting).  
 14. Id. at 2572. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. SOTOMAYOR, supra note 1, at 79. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. at 79-80. 
 21. Id. at 80. 
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I was convinced I would make an excellent detective. My mind 
worked in ways very similar to Nancy Drew’s, I told myself: I was 
a keen observer and listener. I picked up on clues. I figured things 
out logically, and I enjoyed puzzles. I loved the clear, focused feeling 
that came when I concentrated on solving a problem and everything 
else faded out. And I could be brave when I needed to be. . . . I could 
be a great detective, if only I weren’t diabetic.22 
Thwarted in her original plan, Sotomayor redirects her 
focus to another fictional character, the defense lawyer Perry 
Mason, whose weekly television program featured a trial in 
which he invariably established his client’s innocence. But 
she finds her interest expanding also to include the 
prosecutor, because he “was more committed to finding the 
truth than to winning his case.”23 And, finally, she becomes 
“fascinated” by the judge, a shadowy figure who nonetheless 
served as “a personification of justice,” controlling the 
courtroom and resolving the case.24 She finds in the television 
trials “a whole new vocabulary” that was “like the puzzles 
[she] enjoyed, a complex game with its own rules, and one 
that intersected with grand themes of right and wrong.”25 In 
the course of her career, Sotomayor would later play variants 
of all three roles: defense attorney, prosecutor, and trial court 
judge. And, finally, as a Supreme Court Justice, she would 
continue to puzzle out the arguments of her colleagues and 
chart their intersections with those grand themes. 
Although Sotomayor presents herself as a Justice who 
enjoys solving puzzles, she shows little inclination to 
challenge her readers by creating them. Her opinions, even 
those written alone in dissent, seldom offer elevated diction 
or complicated verbal structures. They tend instead to be 
direct and even colloquial in their diction, in most instances 
accessible to lay readers as well as legal professionals. And 
in treating the “grand themes of right and wrong” she prefers 
the simple statement and accessible image to the more 
technical and elaborate language of some of her colleagues. 
There are relatively few metaphors in the ninety-three 
  
 22. Id. 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. at 81. 
 25. Id. 
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majority opinions, concurrences, and dissents that she has 
authored in her first five terms on the Court. And those that 
do appear are generally familiar from common usage. She 
complains, for example, that a federal statute will force 
plaintiffs to try to enforce their rights “with one hand tied 
behind their backs,”26 and a federal statutory provision 
“ensur[es] that an air carrier cannot avoid liability for a 
baseless report by sticking its head in the sand.”27 She tends 
to favor literal and vivid images to make her point, as when 
she observes that a motorist’s limited privacy interest while 
in a vehicle “does not diminish [his] privacy interest in 
preventing an agent of the government from piercing his 
skin”28 to test his blood alcohol level.  
Sotomayor also seems comfortable drawing her imagery 
from baseball, a sport that she has long followed as a devoted 
New York Yankees fan. Looking for a counter to the 
plurality’s examples of the way in which “and” is used to join 
two statutory elements, she offers the following language 
from a stadium ticket: “If today’s baseball game is rained out, 
your ticket shall automatically be converted to a ticket for 
next Saturday’s game, and you shall retain your free souvenir 
from today’s game.”29 More directly, she applies baseball 
rules to emphasize a defendant’s fatal lack of the needed 
qualifications to bring his suit: 
He seeks to challenge the Government’s title to Indian trust land 
(strike one); he seeks to force the Government to relinquish 
possession and title outright (strike two); and he does not claim any 
personal right, title, or interest in the property (strike three).30 
In a decision on water rights in the Red River Valley, she 
playfully introduces another sport by noting that the river 
“has lent its name to a valley, a Civil War campaign, and a 
  
 26. Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1669 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). 
 27. Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852, 862 (2014). 
 28. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1565 (2013). 
 29. Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2221 (2014) (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting).  
 30. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak,   
132 S. Ct. 2199, 2214 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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famed college football rivalry between the Longhorns of 
Texas and the Sooners of Oklahoma.”31  
In contrast to the images of luxury in the bankruptcy 
case, Sotomayor chooses a very different sort of image when 
she dissents from the majority’s interpretation of the federal 
immigration statute. As she constructs her analysis for 
determining whether “aged-out children” who have reached 
the age of twenty-one should retain their priority to join their 
family members in the United States, she employs a vivid 
image drawn from ordinary experience.32 Under the 
majority’s reading of the statute, she points out, if a parent 
fails to reach “the front of the visa line” before the child turns 
twenty-one, that child will be placed “all the way at the back 
of the F2B line.”33 Her reading of the statute differs: 
Congress could have required aged-out children like Ruth Uy to lose 
their place in line and wait many additional years (or even decades) 
before being reunited with their parents, or it could have enabled 
such immigrants to retain their place in line—albeit at the cost of 
extending the wait for other immigrants by some shorter amount.34 
Instead, she argues, Congress has chosen the fairest way to 
resolve the competing interests at stake: the child who has 
already waited patiently in line for many years has been 
favored over the child who has just joined the line and will 
have to wait just a bit longer. Her reading is, she concludes, 
“a commonsense approach to statutory interpretation”35 that 
will result in an equitable distribution of burdens. And her 
image is carefully chosen to resonate with all those who have 
waited in line for far less significant benefits.  
Sotomayor’s preference for examples drawn from 
ordinary life appears in some surprising contexts. Writing for 
the majority to reverse a defamation judgment against an 
airline that had fired a pilot after his angry response to a 
  
 31. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2125 (2013). 
 32. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2217. 
 33. Id. at 2218. 
 34. Id. at 2228. 
 35. Id.  
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failed simulator test, Sotomayor distinguishes the pilot’s 
outburst from less dramatic situations: 
But Hoeper did not just lose his temper; he lost it in circumstances 
that he knew would lead to his firing, which he regarded as the 
culmination of a vendetta against him. . . . In short, Hoeper was not 
some traveling businessman who yelled at a barista in a fit of pique 
over a badly brewed cup of coffee.36  
The businessman has lost his temper in a commonplace, if 
unpleasant, incident, while the pilot’s explosion raises 
legitimate issues about his professional performance. 
Rejecting the Court’s holding of broad whistleblower 
protection under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Sotomayor offers 
an example of what she considers an excessively broad 
reading of the statute. “If, for example,” she writes, “a nanny 
is discharged after expressing a concern to his employer that 
the employer’s teenage son may be participating in some 
Internet fraud, the nanny can bring a § 1514A suit.”37 The 
domestic setting highlights her sense that “there is little 
reason to think that Congress intended to sweep” such a 
broad range of potential situations under the statute.38  
This opinion is also noteworthy in another regard: 
Sotomayor’s deliberate use of “his” when referring to the 
nanny. That gesture, silently challenging the widespread 
assumption that a nanny would be female rather than male, 
is not an isolated instance. In several other opinions, 
Sotomayor makes the same point by switching genders in the 
opposite direction. Writing for the Court in her first term, she 
observes that “[a]n attorney uncertain about what the 
FDCPA requires must choose between, on the one hand, 
exposing herself to liability and, on the other, resolving the 
legal ambiguity against her client’s interest or advising the 
client to settle.”39 In a concurring opinion later that same 
term, she refers to the lodestar calculation of an attorney’s 
fee by “examining the attorney’s reasonable hours expended 
  
 36. Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852, 866. 
 37. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1184 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting).  
 38. Id. 
 39. Jerman v. Carlisle, 559 U.S. 573, 597 (2010). 
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and her reasonable hourly rate . . . .”40 Expanding her focus, 
in a Fourth Amendment case she refers to a GPS system’s 
ability to “generate[ ] a precise, comprehensive record of a 
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail 
about her familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations.”41 And, writing for the Court, she goes a 
step further, observing that “[a]n acquittal is unreviewable 
whether a judge directs a jury to return a verdict of 
acquittal . . . or forgoes that formality by entering a judgment 
of acquittal herself.”42 These pronouns all make the same 
point: the roles played by women in the legal arena as 
litigants, attorneys, and judges are identical to those played 
by men. 
Closely linked to her preference for examples drawn from 
ordinary experience is Sotomayor’s similar invocation of 
common sense as a valuable, and sometimes neglected, tool 
of legal analysis. Writing for the Court, she rejects the 
petitioners’ claim that the Torture Victim Prosecution Act’s 
use of “individual” should be read to include nonsovereign 
organizations, in this case the Palestinian Authority and the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization.43 Since the statute does 
not define “individual,” she turns to “the word’s ordinary 
meaning.”44 Elaborating on the point, she offers a 
commonsensical explanation:  
After all, that is how we use the word in everyday parlance. We say 
“the individual went to the store,” “the individual left the room,” 
and “the individual took the car,” each time referring unmistakably 
to a natural person. And no one, we hazard to guess, refers in 
normal parlance to an organization as an “individual.”45  
Elsewhere, she dissents from the majority’s reading of the 
statutory phrase “actual damages” to exclude mental 
distress, insisting that her broader reading “accords with 
  
 40. Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 602 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 41. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
 42. Evans v. Michigan, 133 S. Ct. 1069, 1074 (2013).  
 43. Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1706 (2012).  
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 1707. 
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common sense.”46 And when, in another case, the dissent 
claims that there is “‘no practical, real-world effect’” to 
treating a jurisdictional rule as mandatory, she counters that 
its position in fact “ignores the real world.”47 For Sotomayor, 
the legal universe is not a closed system; it must be viewed 
as part of that “real world” in determining how its rules apply 
to actual situations. 
The tone of Sotomayor’s opinions remains in harmony 
with her “real world” perspective through her use of 
colloquial diction. Thus, the majority’s view that a search for 
“gang-related items” was justified by their possible 
usefulness in impeaching the defendant “is a non-starter”;48 
neither “snippet” from legislative reports cited by petitioners 
undermines the Court’s holding;49 the dissent has failed to 
identify its “true gripe”;50 a proposed reading of a tax 
regulation “tell[s] courts to treat outliers . . . as flukes”;51 and 
a federal statute doesn’t “so much as hint that it views a $5 
hit to the pocketbook as more worthy of remedy than 
debilitating mental distress.”52  
Sotomayor also uses sentence fragments to introduce a 
conversational tone that sharpens her points. In her first 
dissent on the Court, she responds to the majority’s dismissal 
of an issue raised by the Solicitor General with a tentative 
“Perhaps so” before going on to criticize its easy dismissal of 
executive expertise.53 Disregarding conventional syntax, she 
may ask the reader the one word question “Why?” to ponder 
why the political process must remain open to all citizens on 
  
 46. Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1463 (2012) (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting). 
 47. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 651 n.7 (2012) (quoting 132 S. Ct. at 658 
(Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 48. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1256 (2012). 
 49. Hall v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1882, 1892 (2012). 
 50. Evans v. Michigan, 133 S. Ct. 1069, 1080 n.8 (2013).  
 51. PPL Corp. v. Comm’r., 133 S. Ct. 1897, 1910 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
 52. Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1463 (2012). 
 53. Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. 
Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 312-13 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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equal terms and then answer her own question with another 
sentence fragment: “[f]or the same reason we guard the right 
of every citizen to vote.”54 She may seem to accept the 
majority’s criticism of a statute’s vagueness by responding 
simply “Fair enough” before going on to criticize Congress’ 
unclear drafting.55 Or she may challenge the majority’s 
position by asking simply and colloquially “Says who?” before 
answering her own question with another fragment: 
“Certainly not the statute.”56 Such informal structures serve 
to engage the reader as well as the opposing Justices in an 
exchange of views.  
Although Sotomayor generally prefers to counter the 
other side’s arguments with her own persuasive strategies 
rather than to launch a direct attack, she will occasionally 
offer a restrained rejoinder. When the majority notes that 
two thirds of the jurors and alternates in Skilling’s trial 
lacked any personal link to Enron, she counters mildly that 
“[t]his means, of course, that five of the seated jurors and 
alternates did have connections to friends or colleagues who 
had lost jobs or money as a result of Enron’s collapse—a fact 
that does not strike me as particularly reassuring.”57 At other 
times she is more direct in her criticism. Writing for the 
Court, she counters Justice Scalia’s criticism of “the 
complexity of [her] approach” in another criminal case with a 
two-pronged attack, first noting tartly that the dissent has 
misread the majority and then adding that “we, at least, are 
unwilling to sacrifice accuracy for simplicity.”58 Writing in 
dissent in another case, she notes that “[u]nlike my 
colleagues in the majority, I refuse to assume that Congress 
simply engaged in sloppy drafting.”59 More pointedly, in a 
third dissent she rejects the majority’s reliance on the fact 
  
 54. Schuette v. Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1669 (2014). 
 55. Lawson v. FMR, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1158, 1179 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). 
 56. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2576 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). 
 57. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 459 n.21 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 58. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 369 (2011). 
 59. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1416 (2011). 
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that the police officer’s disputed warrant had been approved 
by two of his of superiors and a district attorney. “Under the 
majority’s test,” she concludes, “four wrongs apparently 
make a right.”60  
Perhaps Sotomayor’s harshest critique of a majority 
opinion appears in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action,61 where six Justices upheld an 
amendment to the Michigan State Constitution banning 
affirmative action in public education.62 She offers examples 
of the ways in which “race matters,” a phrase that she repeats 
no fewer than eight times in less than a single page of her 
opinion. Those echoes appear most powerfully in a paragraph 
offering examples drawn from minority experience: 
  And race matters for reasons that really are only skin deep, 
that cannot be discussed any other way, and that cannot be wished 
away. Race matters to a young man’s view of society when he spends 
his teenage years watching others tense up as he passes, no matter 
the neighborhood where he grew up. Race matters to a young 
woman’s sense of self when she states her hometown, and then is 
pressed, “No, where are you really from?”, regardless of how many 
generations her family has been in the country. Race matters to a 
young person addressed by a stranger in a foreign language, which 
he does not understand because only English was spoken at home. 
Race matters because of the slights, the snickers, the silent 
judgments that reinforce that most crippling of thoughts: “I do not 
belong here.”63  
Rejecting the majority view that such concerns serve only to 
“perpetuate[ ] racial discrimination,”64 she paraphrases Chief 
Justice Roberts’ often quoted conclusion from Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District—
“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race”—while turning it on its 
head to support her argument.65 In Sotomayor’s version, 
“[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to 
  
 60. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1260 (2012). 
 61. 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1651 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 62. 134 S. Ct. at 1623-24 (2014) (Kennedy, J., plurality).  
 63. Id. at 1676 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 64. Id.  
 65. 551 U.S.701, 748 (2007) (Roberts, C.J.). 
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speak openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply 
the Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of 
centuries of racial discrimination.”66 
Just as Sotomayor uses some of her bluntest language 
when discussing the value of affirmative action to young men 
and women, she is at her most sympathetic when dealing 
with the rights of children. The issue in J.D.B. v. North 
Carolina67 was whether the Court’s analysis of Miranda 
rights should be altered when the suspect is a child. J.D.B., 
a thirteen year old, was suspected of breaking and entering 
and larceny. The investigating officer came to his school and 
questioned J.D.B. in the presence of school officials; he 
received no Miranda warnings and no opportunity to contact 
his family before the questioning, which resulted in his 
confession. Writing for the majority, Sotomayor found that a 
suspect’s age should be a factor in considering whether a 
suspect’s Miranda rights have been violated. 
The starting point for Sotomayor’s analysis is the clear 
difference between a child and an adult. In her view, “[a] 
child’s age is far ‘more than a chronological fact.’”68 It follows 
that a child’s response will differ from an adult’s in the same 
situation. That “commonsense” perception, she observes 
dryly, is “self-evident to anyone who was a child once himself, 
including any police officer or judge.”69 This is, in other words, 
an obvious proposition, one that requires no “citation to social 
science and cognitive science authorities.”70 And she sees “no 
reason for police officers or courts to blind themselves to that 
commonsense reality.”71 In fact, she finds, it would be 
“nonsensical” to fail to consider age in assessing a custody 
situation.72  
  
 66. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1676. 
 67. 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). 
 68. Id. at 2403 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 2403 n.5. 
 71. Id. at 2399. 
 72. Id. at 2405. 
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Sotomayor thus links two related propositions: “Children 
cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults,”73 and judges, 
“including those whose childhoods have long since passed,”74 
are perfectly capable of taking into account the age of a child 
being questioned. Returning to one of her favorite themes, 
the usefulness of common sense in legal analysis, she 
concludes with a tidy summary: “In short, officers and judges 
need no imaginative powers, knowledge of developmental 
psychology, training in cognitive science, or expertise in 
social and cultural anthropology. They simply need the 
common sense to know that a 7-year-old is not a 13-year-old 
and neither is an adult.”75  
The theme of common sense legal analysis is tied in turn 
to another theme, the role of empathy in judicial 
decisionmaking. Here, she insists, “the question becomes 
how a reasonable person would understand the 
circumstances, either from the perspective of a blind person 
or, as here, a 13-year-old child.”76 Since we have all been 
children, however long ago, she feels comfortable drawing on 
that shared human experience to inform the way in which 
legal doctrine should apply to children in the legal system.  
Justice Sotomayor locates her opinions in a framework 
broader than the current state of the law, a framework based 
on her sense that the law should be interpreted not merely 
as a technical discipline but also as a reflection of human 
experience. When she weighs the impact of an immigration 
statute on family unity or police interrogation on a child 
suspect, she reminds her colleagues that they may, and at 
times should, draw on that experience to reach their 
decisions. In both of her public roles—as autobiographer and 
Justice—Sotomayor asks her readers and her judicial 
colleagues to keep in mind the links between life and the law. 
  
 73. Id. at 2404. 
 74. Id. at 2407. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 2403 n.9. 
